Much research was carried in Israel and abroad about this unique operation, in which two European powers united in a written pact (The Sèvres Protocol) with Israel for a combined military move.
The three party agreement was made possible at a certain point in time, when leaders in the three states identified common interests, leading them to act against president Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and his regime.
In 1955 – 1956 Israel's borders were constantly attacked by Fedayeen terrorists, recruited by Egypt and operated from the Gaza Strip. Some Israeli reprisal acts against Egyptian targets caused a dangerous rising of tensions between the two states. Already at the end of 1955, Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, proposed to overthrow the Nasser regime as a solution to Israel's security problem, by occupying the Gaza Strip. However, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, David Ben Gurion, preferred the occupation of the straits of Tiran, blocked by Egypt to Israeli shipping, as having a better chance of being accepted by the world powers. This proposal was rejected by the government, the expected war with Egypt was deferred, and the appraisal in Israel was that Egypt will complete its war preparations in the summer of 1956.
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, representing post monarchic Egypt and a leading member of the Free Officers that overthrew King Faruq, regarded the strengthening of the army as a way to fulfil his dream of leading a Pan Arab Movement, thus becoming an important international figure. Supported by the USSR, in September 1955 Nasser signed a huge arms deal with Czechoslovakia, undermining the balance of military power, in tanks, aircraft, artillery and sea craft, between the IDF and the Egyptian army, mainly in its qualitative aspect, due to the supply of advanced modern Soviet arms.
Feeling secure about his status, on July 26, 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and rejected all proposals for its international management. Thus he hurt the national interests of Britain, France, and other Western states, increasing apprehensions regarding the freedom of navigation in the Canal.
In the following months, Britain and France prepared to take control of the Suez Canal by military force, calling their operation "Musketeer."
Israel saw these preparations as an opportunity to realize its goals – to lift the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and to overwhelm the Egyptian army, thus removing the threat of an Egyptian attack and the Fedayeen from the Gaza Strip.
Already in June 1956 discussions have begun between the heads of the Israeli and French defense systems, regarding cooperation in arms acquisition and intelligence. By that time it was clear that Nasser was supporting the rebellion in Algeria, thus undermining French colonial rule in North Africa, therefore the French regarded positively Israel's participation in an operation to overthrow his regime. These negotiations, resulting in a big arms deal between Israel and France, sow the seeds that would mature in discussions carried in September-October 1956 in both Israel and France, in which the tri-partite military operation against Egypt was formulated.
On October 22, 1956 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres and Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan secretly travelled from Israel to an isolated house in Sèvres to meet the French Minister of Defense Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau and Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces General Maurice Challe, and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and his assistant Sir Patrick Dean. After 48 hours of negotiations and compromise, the seven-point agreement was signed on October 24, 1956 by Ben-Gurion, Pineau and Dean, The Sèvres Protocol. At the insistence of the Israeli diplomats, wanting to prevent being abandoned in the middle of the invasion, each group left Sèvres with a signed copy, written in French.
According to the Protocol "Israel would be invited to attack the Egyptian army in Sinai and pose a threat to the Suez Canal and this would provide Britain and France with the pretext to activate their military plans and occupy the Suez Canal Zone, ostensibly in order to separate the combatants and protect the canal. The real aim was, of course, to take control of the Canal Zone and to void its nationalization by Egypt. The protocol also included a commitment to defend Israel from Egyptian air attacks during the expected warfare.
In time the Protocol was called a "Collusion," which, when exposed forced the resignation of the British Foreign Secretary.
Israel prepared for the operation, spurred by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, who' already in November 1955 submitted a plan to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and lift the Egyptian blockade. At that time, the plan was rejected by Ben Gurion.
At the same time Israel's Ministry of Defense, headed by Shimon Peres, discussed with the French an increase in military procurement. The excellent contacts which evolved between Shimon Peres, Joseph Nahmias, head of the Israeli procurement delegation in Paris, and others on the one hand and top French defense and military officials on the other hand, were very helpful. In 1955 – 1956, French military aircraft, tanks and other types of equipment were procured for the IDF, thus somewhat offsetting the dangerous outcomes of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal.
During the Sèvres negotiations the IDF began preparing to operation known as Operation Kadesh. The last order was issued on October 28, 1956, defining three goals for the operation: A. Creating a military threat to the Suez Canal by capturing objectives in its vicinity; B. Occupying the Tiran Straits; C. Upsetting and destroying the Egyptian military presence in northern Sinai.
Ben Gurion kept the preparation secret from most other Government Minister, except a few, including Golda Meir who was negotiating with the French. Only on the eve of the operation, October 28, he presented the plan to the government for its approval. Later that evening an announcement was issued about the mobilization of some reserve battalions due to concerns about possible surprise attacks along Israel's borders.
In the evening of October 29, battalion 890, commanded by Raphael Eitan, was parachuted on the eastern approaches of the Mitla Pass near the Cana.
The campaign was conducted in the three axis: In the north from the Gaza Strip to El Qantara; in the center: Qseima, Abu-Ageila, Ismailia; in the south: Qseima, Mitla, Port Tawfiq. Another force advanced south toward Sharm el-Sheikh. Without going into too many details, suffice us to say that it was the first time for the IDF to deploy whole divisions on the battleground.
All plans, preparations, battles and their outcomes are documented in 400 declassified files, which are open to the public in the reading room of The IDF and Defense Establishment Archive
Some of these are presented in the present display.