pp. 1-7
When asked about a retaliatory act from the sea, he answers that he heard about it, but it was not serious. He is asked to describe in detail his personal meeting with the Chief of Staff.
Dado emphasizes his need to constantly remind the Chief of Staff of the northern sector, which is endangered too. "If war will break out with Egypt, I am convinced that a war with Syria will break out too." (p. 5)
His detailed plan for a war with Syria. Our attack, he says, should take into consideration our defensive needs. "I believe that the war should end with occupation, not on the Green Line." P.5
We should hit with a sledgehammer: north, center and south.
pp. 11-12
Dado is asked about the various opinions in the General Staff, about his personal ties with the Chief of Staff. He had face to face conversations with Rabin, but refuses to enter into details. The plan to occupy the Gaza Strip "made me sick." P. 12
pp. 15-16
Following the Government decision on May 27 to wait two or three weeks, the generals convene to discuss the waiting period. Opinions are divided. Dado is of the opinion that we should attack immediately, because the war is a certainty.
p. 19
The interviewers understand that Dado's proposal – The best defense is offense – was rejected. Dado disagrees, insisting that the Chief of Staff accepted all his proposals as is. They were not implemented due to the lack of equipment.
p. 20
His greatest dilemma during the war. His "Sledgehammer North" was approved. He decides about the zero hour, but not sure whether to attack on June 7. Uncertain about the aerial support, his forces' size, the bad weather. In consultation with the deputy Chief of staff, postponing the attack to the next day.
p. 21
Just before the attack a telephone call to Rabin. Rabin insists "We can only attack along the Green Line." Dado objects, we shall gain nothing from such an attack "paying the full price for no gain." The offensive is delayed again.
p.22
Following the postponement of the offensive, a meeting with Levi Eshkol (The Prime Minister). Dado explains that can attack with his present forces. Eshkol promises to "make an effort."
On his way out, one of the secretaries is asking him for the river Banias as a birthday gift. "Miriam," he answers, "I shall do all that is in my power, but you do your part."
pp. 23-25
The interviewers are explaining that his testimony about June 7-8 was very helpful. They explain why it was not possible to launch the offensive on June 7, filling in some missing details.
p. 27
Colonel Sarig is quoting the Minister of Defense objection to the attack on Syria: "Whoever will raise a hand against Syria, his arm shall break." The Chief of Staff, on the other hand supports the attack. In a meeting at the Prime Minister's office, the Minister of Defense finally agrees to attack Syria.
pp. 33-34
Yitzhak Rabin and Moshe Dayan explain their opposition to the offensive against Syria. The apprehension from the Syrian reaction, the forthcoming ceasefire with Egypt, more loss of life. Dado raises counter propositions. Not attacking will constitute an irreversible damage. (p. 34).
Dado describes his frustration at delaying the attack.
pp. 44-46
The night battle of June 9-10 in the Golan Heights. The expected but not realized ceasefire. The battle is renewed.
pp. 47-50
A meeting of Eshkol, Dayan, Bar-Lev and Dado. Capture of Mount Hermon.
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