Mordechay Hod, Air Force Commander's testimony

​November 14, 1969, first meeting with Mordechai Hod, Air Force Commander, regarding the General Staff

pp. 1-3

The news about a possible war, no one takes it seriously. The Air Force does not mobilize, only verifying its preparedness. Pilots, etc. are mobilized slowly.

p.2

"My impression at the time was that the IDF did not believe in its ability to occupy the whole of the Sinai Peninsula, perhaps some local achievement.

p.3

"I felt there was no coherent thinking… plenty of plans. No resolution. Neither concerning the objective nor the plan…"

pp. 4-8

The Air Force's advantage is on the offensive. The Zero Hour depends on the Air Force. Why was the Zero Hour so long in comparison to others? Where did we gain faith prior to the war?

Unlike the Minister of Defense, Hod declares that only 4-5% were left of the Egyptian Air Force.

p.8

It was understood in the General Staff that any delay means a harder war.

pp. 9-14

A government meeting regarding the war plans. The IDF:

p.11

"Will try to destroy the Egyptian Army in the Sinai Peninsula and occupy it.

The Chief of Staff wishes to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh. According to Hod, this was impossible.

pp 14-16

A lack of equipment in the Air Force

pp. 16-17

Dayan's concept of the Air Force roles in the war.

"The previous government did not have the courage needed for war. The present "Unity" Government has the capacity and will to make decision."

pp. 18-20

The risks of the offensive and the importance of surprise.

pp. 21-24

The complex relations between the Air Force and the Navy. Why did the Air Force not assist the navy?

November 27, 1969, December 16, 1967, meetings with Mordechai Hod, Air Force Commander, regarding the General Staff

pp. 1-3

The Chief of Staff ordered the Air Force to rest. Did it get tired after a one day warfare?

pp. 7-9

The Air Force was ignorant about its targets. There were no clear method or means to know.

The request to bomb Damascus.

p. 14

Whether to drop dummies in Kuneitra's rear, to alleviate the pressure at the front.

pp. 15-17

The Air Force plans were presented to the General Staff as a fait accomplit. Hod takes Rabin on a tour of the air bases, to meet commanders. For the first time Rabin is acquainted with the Air Force plans.

The relationships of the General Staff with the Air Force. Pressure over statistics showing the Air Force is losing many personnel.

p. 20

"… Never was so much dependent of the Air Force as in the Six Day war. All gratitude was drowned in a sea of sentiments, successes of all kinds… "

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